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In an increasingly globalised world, health issues transcend the domain of national
legislation. This holds true not only for infectious diseases, as seen with the current
outbreak of the Corona-Virus, but also for non-communicable diseases (NCD) such
as diabetes, cancer, obesity or cardiovascular diseases. According to the World
Health Organisation (WHO), the latter are the leading global cause of death by killing
41 million people each year worldwide.
A considerable number of NCDs could be prevented by measures implemented by
state-, corporate- and non-state-actors at national, regional and international level.
Yet, the question of how to frame legal action to control the spread of NCDs is far
from answered. While it has proven difficult to adopt legislation in the field, a plethora
of legally non-binding (soft law) instruments at the international and domestic level
raise the question of the potential advantages of voluntary commitments for the
prevention of NCDs.
After a short overview on the current global situation of NCD control, this post
enquires these issues by leaving the international plane and providing a case study
of NCD control in Switzerland. It thereby gives an insight into the difficulties to adopt
hard measures in this field and into the potential advantages of soft law. As will be
shown in the concluding section, the case study of Switzerland contributes to the
general understanding of the challenges and prospects in the prevention and control
of NCDs at the international level.
Hard or soft law? Current approaches to prevent NCDs
Legally binding measures to brake the spread of NCD imply, for example, taxes
on fattening food or laws against tobacco and alcohol advertisements (cf. e.g. the
law on tobacco control adopted by the Armenian parliament in February 2020).
Meanwhile, the adoption of binding regulations in the field of global public health has
proven to be an onerous procedure. Although the WHO is constitutionally equipped
with extraordinary legislative competencies, the organisation referred to it only
three times since its foundation in 1948 (cf. International Health Regulations (2005),
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (2003), Nomenclature Regulations
(1967)).
Instead, the WHO as well as many national governments refer to soft law
instruments to tackle the challenge of NCDs. Prominent international examples
formulating voluntary targets for member states are the WHO action plan for the
prevention and control of noncommunicable diseases, the Global Strategy on Diet,
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Physical Activity and Health and the Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of
Alcohol.
The prevention and control of NCDs in Switzerland: a case study
In order to understand the difficulties of adopting legally binding measures to
prevent NCDs on the one hand and to shed light on the potential advantages of
soft approaches on the other, it is instructive to take a look at the national level.
With its scepticism towards state inference in NCD-related issues and its strong
federalist structure, Switzerland constitutes an interesting example. Hence, the
following paragraphs provide a short case study by (a) addressing the political and
legal situation in Switzerland with regard to the prevention of NCDs and (b) analysing
the potential advantages of soft commitments.
Measures for the prevention of NCDs
(a) In Switzerland, comprehensive legal measures to fight NCDs are difficult to
obtain due to the fragmented nature of the country’s health policies: federalism
attributes large competencies to the cantons and a multitude of private actors play
an important role in the development and implementation of health measures.
Furthermore, the political climate is traditionally hesitant towards legislation in the
field of NCD control. This has been shown, for example, by the rejection of the
Federal Law on Health Prevention and Promotion by the council of states in 2012.
This law aimed at establishing a comprehensive framework on health promotion
and on the prevention and early detection of diseases. The parliamentary debate
revealed a deeply rooted critical stance towards state interventions in this field and
showed the considerable political influence of tobacco and nutritional industries.
Another example is the rejection of a sugar tax by the Swiss parliament in 2019. One
of the main arguments in this context was that voluntary measures as set out in the
Swiss Nutrition Strategy and the strategic collaboration of the Swiss government with
the food industry (‘Milan Declaration’) are sufficient in order to reduce the extensive
consumption of sugar.
The tendency to prefer voluntary action to hard legal measures is further reflected
in the adoption of the national strategies on the Prevention of Non-Communicable
Diseases and “Health 2020” in 2013 (“Health 2020” was replaced by the strategy
“Health 2030” in 2019). Both strategies define the prevention of NCDs as one of the
main priorities of Swiss health policy.
Potential advantages of soft law
(b) The non-legal approaches developed to curb the challenge of NCDs are
exemplary for the difficulties to adopt hard legal measures in this field. And although
they are frequently used, legally non-binding agreements are often perceived as
inferior to hard law. However, instead of regarding hard and soft law as binary,
it might be instructive to see soft instruments as complementary to hard law.
Furthermore, relating to the example of NCD prevention in Switzerland, the following
paragraphs outline three specific advantages of soft law.
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(i) One reason to adopt soft law instruments in the field of NCD control is the
surmounting of deadlocks. In situations where it is not possible to adopt hard
legislative measures, soft instruments can provide a viable alternative. This
corresponds with a political reality in which many different and powerful actors
impede legal action. The discussions on the introduction of a sugar tax and the
rejection of the Federal Law on Health Prevention and Promotion in Switzerland are
indicative of the difficulties to adopt hard legal measures for the prevention of NCDs.
As a consequence, soft law instruments stepped into the breach: the voluntary
commitments formulated in the Milan Declaration as well as the soft law-strategies
on NCD prevention triggered different measures to brake the spread of NCDs at
communal, cantonal and federal level.
(ii) Soft law instruments can have a coordinating function by bundling different
activities under one strategic umbrella. Given the fragmented nature of the Swiss
political system, these coordination efforts have an important standing. This has
been shown for example in the evaluation of the first health strategy “Health2020”
where the coordination effect of health activities at national, cantonal and communal
level was declared as one of the key success factors.
(iii) Another advantage of soft law instruments is that they keep public discourse
alive. In Switzerland, this was shown by the development of different strategies in
the realm of NCD prevention which was triggered i.a. by the rejection of the Federal
Law on Health Prevention and Promotion. The adoption and implementation of these
soft law instruments were and are important factors in keeping measures of NCD
prevention at the political agenda. Hence, it is mainly the merit of soft law that the
importance of health promotion and prevention to fight chronic diseases did not fall
into oblivion.
Soft Law and NCD control: Insights for the international level
The arguments set out in the previous paragraphs illustrate that soft law instruments
and their distinctive advantages play an important role with regard to NCD
prevention in Switzerland. From these insights, some general conclusions can be
drawn for NCD-related health policies at the international scale:
Firstly, the field of NCD prevention is intricate and tangent upon many economic and
political controversies. Against this background, soft law can function as a mean to
resolve deadlocks in the making of hard law. This holds true for the national level
as seen with the example of Switzerland but also for the international scale, where
even more actors and interests are at stake. A historical example is the adoption
of the WHO’s legally non-binding Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes in
1981: the health-promoting regulation of marketing practices of infant nutrition stood
against the commercial interests of some WHO member states. Hence, in order
to avoid the rejection of a binding instrument, a soft approach was chosen. Similar
tendencies prevail today for international governance to prevent the health-damaging
effects of alcohol, tobacco or unhealthy nutrition, which is often impetuously opposed
by multilateral companies exerting considerable influence on global public health
negotiations. As seen in the case study of Switzerland, this tension between public
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health protection and economic interests can potentially be mitigated through the
adoption of non-binding Codes of Practice, guidelines or strategies.
Secondly, the coordinating effect of soft law instruments is valuable also at the
international level. As set out for example in the WHO’s global action plan on NCDs,
the organisation’s soft instruments can stimulate interaction with other UN agencies
or international NGOs. They can further coordinate and support activities of WHO
member states, i.a. by providing evidence-based knowledge, international advocacy
and indicators to monitor progress.
And thirdly, the function of keeping public debates alive is an important aspect at the
international scale. Soft law instruments on NCD prevention can be the expression
of an authoritative and shared consensus of WHO member states that action is
required. This could potentially encourage the development of legally binding
commitments. Moreover, it could lead to the development of customary international
law by laying the grounds for opinio juris and continuous state practice.
Yet, although these advantages of soft law constitute valuable contributions in the
field of NCD prevention, they cannot replace ‘hard’ measures at national level as
fiscal interventions (e.g. taxation of sugary drinks) or restrictions of advertisement
(e.g. with regard to tobacco or alcohol). Therefore, in order to curb the global
spread of NCDs effectively, the specific advantages of both approaches should be
harnessed.
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